Abstract. We give a unified presentation of the set-theoretic axioms of generic absoluteness, we survey the known results regarding their consistency strength and some of their consequences as well as their relationship to other kinds of set-theoretic axioms, and we provide a list of the main open problems.
Introduction
A common theme of Set Theory, after the discovery by Cohen in 1963 of the method of forcing for building models of ZFC, has been how to get rid of forcing. The forcing technique has proved to be, over the last 40 years, an extremely powerful and flexible tool for building models of ZFC with the most varied properties, thereby proving the independence from the ZFC axioms of a large amount of mathematical statements. Spurred by this array of independence results, it has become a challenge for Set Theory to discover new axioms that would eliminate the relativity of the truth of mathematical statements with respect to different models of ZFC obtained by forcing. The ultimate axiom of this sort would be to require that V is elementary equivalent to V P for every forcing notion P. But this is clearly impossible, since we can force incompatible statements, for instance, the Continuum Hypothesis and its negation. So, one has to restrict either the class of statements that are absolute between V and its generic extensions, or the class of forcing extensions, or both. But how do we choose between two forceable statements that cannot be both simultaneously true? The answer is that we do not choose, that is, we do not discriminate against statements of the same logical complexity. We want all forceable statements of the same logical complexity to be true. This is always the case for Σ 1 statements, i.e., formulas of the language of Set Theory which, in normal form, have only existential quantifiers. But for formulas of the next higher level of complexity, the Σ 2 , requiring that all those that are forceable are true, is false (both the Continuum Hypothesis and its negation are Σ 2 ). Thus, we must abandon the ultimate axiom and settle for weaker forms. Namely, we may require that some definable subclass W of V , which is seen as an approximation to V , is sufficiently elementarily equivalent to W as computed in some generic extensions of V . Whenever W is a substructure of W as computed in the generic extensions, then one can even require that W be an elementary substructure of the generic W . That is, we may have elements of the ground-model W as parameters. Many axioms of this sort have been studied in the literature and are currently one of the main topics in the foundations of Set Theory. These are the axioms of generic absoluteness, which may also be called axioms of generic invariance, that is, they assert that whatever can be forced is true, subject only to the restrictions that are strictly necessary for them to be consistent with the axioms of ZFC.
We give here a unified presentation of the axioms of generic absoluteness. We survey the known results regarding their consistency strength and their relationship to the axioms of large cardinals and the bounded forcing axioms. We illustrate some of their consequences, specially in Descriptive Set Theory, and we provide a list of the main open questions.
Our notation and basic definitions are standard, as in [24] . V is the class of all sets. If P is a forcing notion, i.e., a partial ordering, in V , then V P is the Boolean-valued model corresponding to the Boolean completion of P. In this survey we will only consider forcing notions that are sets, as opposed to class forcing notions. A formula of the first-order language of set theory is Σ 0 if all its quantifiers are bounded. For n > 0, a formula is Σ n if, in its normal form, begins with a sequence of n blocs of unbounded quantifiers of the same kind, starting with a block of existential quantifiers, and followed by a Σ 0 formula. L is the constructible universe. For an infinite cardinal κ, H(κ) is the set of all sets whose transitive closure has cardinality < κ. For a transitive set X, L(X) is the smallest transitive model of ZF that contains all the ordinals and X. L(R) is the smallest transitive model of ZF that contains all ordinals and all the reals. If x is a real number, L [x] is the least transitive model of ZFC that contains all the ordinals and x.
I want to thank David Asperó, Sy Friedman, Ralf Schindler, and Hugh Woodin for their comments on the first versions of this paper. I am also grateful to S. Friedman for sending me some of his unpublished work on these topics. Finally, I thank the members of the Organizing and Scientific Committee of the Colloquium Logicum 2002 for inviting me to Münster.
A general framework for axioms of generic absoluteness
An axiom of generic absoluteness is given by requiring that some definable subclass W of V is sufficiently elementarily equivalent to W, as computed in certain generic extensions of V. That is, for some class of sentences Φ and all forcing notions P belonging to some class of forcing notions Γ,
Thus, we have three variables:
• The subclass W of V.
• The class Φ of sentences.
• The class Γ of forcing notions. By combining these three variables we obtain the different sorts of axioms of generic absoluteness. In general, the larger the classes W , Φ, and Γ, the stronger the axiom. But there is always a trade-off between them. For instance, as we will see, in the extreme case when one of the three variables is maximal, e.g., when W = V , Φ is the class of all sentences, or Γ is the class of all forcing notions, then the other two must be very small for the axiom to be consistent with ZFC.
To unify our presentation we will use the following notation for axioms of generic absoluteness: A(W, Φ, Γ) is the assertion that W is Φ-elementarily equivalent to W V P for all P ∈ Γ. Since we want A(W, Φ, Γ) to be an axiom, hence a sentence in the firstorder language of Set Theory, W , Φ, and Γ must be definable classes.
Notice that if Φ ⊆ Φ and Γ ⊆ Γ , then A(W, Φ , Γ ) implies A(W, Φ, Γ). Also notice that A(W, Φ, Γ) is equivalent to A(W,Φ, Γ), whereΦ is the closure of Φ under finite Boolean combinations. Thus, for instance,
An important case is when Φ is a class of sentences with parameters. In this case, for A(W, Φ, Γ) to make sense, the parameters must belong to W ∩ W V P , for all P ∈ Γ. In particular, if Φ = Σ n (W ), i.e., Φ is the class of all Σ n sentences with parameters from W , and W ⊆ W V P for all P ∈ Γ, then A(W, Φ, Γ) is just the assertion that W is a Σ n -elementary substructure of W V P , for all P ∈ Γ. As is customary, instead of Σ n (W ) we will write Σ ∼ n . If the class of parameters is some X properly contained in W , then we write Σ n (X) for the class of Σ n sentences with parameters from X.
We write Σ ω for the class of all sentences of the first-order language of set theory, and Σ ∼ ω for the class of all such sentences with parameters in W .
If Φ = Σ ω , then A(W, Φ, Γ) should be regarded as an axiom schema, that is, as A(W, Σ n , Γ) for each n ∈ ω. Similarly if Φ = Σ ∼ ω . If Γ contains only one element, P, then we will write A(W, Φ, P), instead of A(W, Φ, Γ). If Γ is the class of all set-forcing notions, then we just write A(W, Φ).
Some trivial cases
Let us first consider some forms of A(W, Φ, Γ) that are either provable or refutable in ZFC. So, as axioms, they are of no interest, since they are either trivial or false. 
A natural class of axioms
A family of natural axioms of generic absoluteness is obtained when:
, for some definable uncountable cardinal κ; (2) Φ is the class of Σ n sentences, some n ∈ ω, or the class Σ ω of all sentences, with or without parameters from W ; and (3) Γ is a definable class of posets which contains at least a non-trivial element.
Why the H(κ) and not the V α , α an ordinal? On the one hand, for a regular cardinal κ, H(κ) is a model of ZF minus the Power-set axiom, and so it satisfies Replacement, thus being a better model in the sense of forcing. For instance, if P ∈ H(κ), then, a filter G ⊆ P is generic over V iff it is generic over H(κ). Moreover, for Φ = Σ ∼ 1 , which, as we will see, is one of the most relevant cases, we have that if
Of particular interest, besides the class of all posets, are the classes of posets that have been extensively studied in the literature and form an increasing chain, namely, the ccc posets, the proper and semi-proper posets, the posets that preserve stationary subsets of ω 1 , and the posets that preserve ω 1 (see [24] for the definitions). To make the notation more readable, we shall write ccc for the class of ccc posets, Proper for the class of proper posets, Semi-proper for the class of semi-proper posets, Stat-pres for the class of posets that preserve stationary subsets of ω 1 , and ω 1 -pres for the class of posets that preserve ω 1 . We have:
Of interest are also some subclasses of the ccc posets, namely, the classes of posets which are σ-centered (a poset is σ-centered if it can be partitioned into countably many classes so that each class is finite-wise compatible), the σ-linked (a poset is σ-linked if it can be partitioned into countably many classes so that each class is pair-wise compatible), the Knaster (a poset has the Knaster property if every uncountable set contains an uncountable subset of pair-wise compatible elements), and the Productive-ccc (a poset is productive-ccc if its product with any ccc poset is also ccc). We will write Prod-ccc and Knaster for the classes of productive-ccc posets and Knaster posets, respectively. These classes also form a chain:
Another classification of forcing notions is obtained with regard to their definability. Both interesting and natural are the axioms A(H(κ), Φ, Γ), where Γ consists of those posets in one of the classes above that are definable (Σ n or Π n definable, some n) in H(κ), with or without parameters. An important example is the class of projective posets, namely, those definable in H(ω 1 ) with parameters. As usual, that a poset is, say, Σ n -definable in H(ω 1 ), means that the set, the ordering relation, and the incompatibility relation are all Σ n -definable in H(ω 1 ). Similarly for the Π n -definable posets.
Of special interest are the axioms of the form A(H(ω 2 ), Φ, Γ), both for their consequences and for being equivalent to the Bounded Forcing Axioms (see 6.4 below): Given a partial ordering P, the Bounded Forcing Axiom for P, in short BF A(P), is the following statement:
For every collection
For a class of posets Γ, BF A(Γ) is the statement that for every P ∈ Γ, BF A(P).
M A ω 1 , Martin's axiom for ω 1 , is BF A(ccc). BPFA, the bounded proper forcing axiom, is BF A(P roper). BSPFA, the bounded semi-proper forcing axiom, is BF A(Semi-proper ). Finally, BMM, the bounded Martin's maximum, is BF A(Stat-pres).
Thus, in this paper we will concentrate on axioms of the form A(W, Φ, Γ), where
and where Γ is one of the classes of forcing notions considered above.
We shall begin by looking at the smallest non-trivial W , namely, H(ω 1 ).
For every forcing notion P,
Hence, from 3.2 above, the first interesting case is when Φ = Σ 2 .
Φ = Σ 2 :
A(H(ω 1 ), Σ 2 ) fails in L, since saying that there exists a non-constructible real is Σ 2 , hence it is not provable in ZFC. However,
The following theorem follows from a result of Feng-Magidor-Woodin [29] , and was proved independently by S. Friedman (see [13] ).
is equiconsistent with the existence of a Σ 2 -reflecting cardinal. i.e., a regular cardinal κ such that V κ Σ2 V .
The proof of the Theorem above actually shows that A(H(ω
, for every real x. This has recently been improved by S. Friedman:
Stat-pres) is equiconsistent with the existence of a Σ 2 -reflecting cardinal.
In particular, Friedman shows, using R. Schindler's faster reshaping forc-
It follows immediately from [18] and 
As we will see in section 6 below, Bounded Forcing Axioms are actually equivalent to axioms of generic Σ
). But they also imply generic Σ ∼ 2 -absoluteness for H(ω 1 ). Namely,
. That the last four implications cannot be reversed can be easily seen, as S. Friedman has pointed out, by noticing that all axioms of the form A(H(ω 1 ), Σ ∼ n , Γ) are preserved after collapsing the continuum to ω 1 by σ-closed forcing. Hence, they are all consistent with CH, and so they do not imply any of the bounded forcing axioms.
It is also worth mentioning the following surprising result of S. Friedman:
for every x ⊆ ω (see Theorem 6.6 below).
For many of the ccc and proper forcing notions P associated to regularity properties of sets of reals, like Lebesgue measurability, the Baire property, or the Ramsey property, there are interesting characterizations of the axioms A(H(ω 1 ), Σ ∼ 2 , P) in terms of these regularity properties holding for the projective classes of ∆ ∼ . We state here only the parametrized forms. For instance, from [7] we have:
Let Cohen be the poset for adding a Cohen real, and let Random be the poset for adding a random real. Then,
set of reals has the property of Baire. It should be noted that all these forcing notions are proper and Borel, i.e., the set of conditions is a Borel set, and both the ordering and the incompatibility relation are Borel subsets of the plane. The following is a long-standing open question:
class of Borel ccc forcing notions, imply that every projective set of real numbers is Lebesgue measurable?
The most general result along these lines is the following theorem of Feng-Magidor-Woodin:
is equivalent to the statement that every ∆ ∼ 1 2 set of reals is universally Baire. Let us now consider the next level of complexity of Φ.
Φ = Σ 3 :
We start with the following version of a result from [7] , which uses a Lemma of H. Woodin from [41] to the effect that if X is an uncountable sequence of reals in V and c is Cohen-generic over V , then in V [c] there is no random real over L(X, c).
Theorem 5.9. Let ω 1 -Random be the σ-linked forcing notion for adding ω 1 random reals.
The point (for (1)) is that if ω
= ω 1 , then we may add ω 1 random reals so that, in the forcing extension, for every real y there is a random real over L(x, y). By A(H(ω 1 ), Σ 3 , ω 1 -Random) this holds in V , and by L(x, c) , contradicting the aforementioned result of Woodin.
A(H(ω 1
The following results give the exact consistency strengths. Hence, from 5.10, the axiom A(H(ω 1 ), Σ 3 , ω 1 -pres) is also equiconsistent with the existence of the sharp of every set.
The next theorem follows from some results due to Kunen and Harrington-Shelah [20] (see [11] and [13] ): Theorem 5.13. For all n such that 3 ≤ n ≤ ω, the following are equiconsistent:
ccc). (3) There exists a weakly compact cardinal.
An argument of A. R. D. Mathias, also implicit in [25] , is used in the following result to show that
Theorem 5.14. ([11] ) For all n such that 3 ≤ n ≤ ω, the following are equiconsistent:
(3) There exists a Mahlo cardinal.
Let us recall from [12] that a ccc poset P is strongly-Σ ∼ n if it is Σ n -definable in H(ω 1 ) with parameters, and the predicate "x codes a maximal antichain of P" is also Σ n -definable in H(ω 1 ) with parameters. A projective poset P is absolutely-ccc if it is ccc in every inner model W of V which satisfies ZFC and contains the parameters of the definition of P.
Let us also recall from [11] that a projective poset P is strongly-proper if for every countable transitive model N of a fragment of ZFC with the parameters of the definition of P in N and such that (
, and for every p ∈ P N , there is q ≤ p which is (N, P)-generic, i.e., if N |= "A is a maximal antichain of P", then A ∩ N is predense below q.
Notice that if P is a projective poset, N H(λ), and the parameters of the definition of P are in N , then a condition q is (N, P)-generic iff it is (N , P)-generic, whereN is the transitive collapse of N . Thus, a projective strongly-proper poset is proper.
From [7] (see 5.9 above) we have that just for Γ = {ω 1 -Random, Cohen},
, for every real x. Notice that both ω 1 -Random and Cohen are Σ 1 -definable in H(ω 1 ) ccc forcing notions. The sharpest result at the level of consistency strength of an inaccessible cardinal is the following: This result is optimal, for there exists a, provably in ZFC, ccc poset P which is both Σ 2 and Π 2 definable in H(ω 1 ), without parameters, and for which the axiom A(H(ω 1 ), Σ 3 , P) fails if ω 1 is not a Π 1 -Mahlo cardinal in L (see [12] ). A regular cardinal κ is Σ n -Mahlo (Π n -Mahlo) if every club subset of κ that is Σ n -definable (Π n -definable) in H(κ) contains an inaccessible cardinal. Every Π 1 -Mahlo cardinal is an inaccessible limit of inaccessible cardinals.
Theorem 5.15 ([11], [12]). For every 3 ≤ n ≤ ω the following are equiconsistent (modulo ZF C):
The general equiconsistency result for proper forcing notions is due to R. Schindler: 
For the definition of remarkable cardinal see [34] . The proof of the Theorem actually shows that A(H(ω 1 ), Σ 3 , Proper ) implies that ω 1 is a remarkable cardinal in L.
The following are the main open questions about the consistency strength of these axioms:
Questions 5.17. What is the exact consistency strength of
The next theorem generalizes 5.4 and 5.5:
Assume that x exists for every real x and that the second uniform indiscernible is < ω 2 . Then,
pres). There are few results on the consequences of axioms of the form A(H(ω
in Descriptive Set Theory. In particular there are no known equivalences with regularity properties of projective sets of reals, as in the case of the Σ 2 -absoluteness axioms considered in the last section. However, we do have the following result of H. Judah (see [7] It is also shown in [29] that the converse does not hold.
5.3. Φ = Σ n , 4 ≤ n ≤ ω. A generalization of an argument of Woodin [41] , yields the following result from [21] :
The general equiconsistency result is due to Hauser-Woodin (see [21] ):
Theorem 5.23. The following are equiconsistent:
There are infinitely-many strong cardinals.
A proper class of Woodin cardinals suffices to imply full absoluteness for H(ω 1 ) under all set-forcing extensions. Indeed, the following theorem of Woodin is a consequence of the results proved in [42] (see also [24] ). Hauser (unpublished) showed that this consistency strength is at least that of n−3 strong cardinals and at most that of n−3 strong cardinals with a Σ 2 -reflecting cardinal above them.
Theorem 5.24. If there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, then A(H(ω
1 ), Σ ∼ ω ).
Whether a Σ ω -Mahlo cardinal is necessary for the consistency of A(H(ω
The axiom A(H(ω 2 ), Σ 2 , Γ) is false for most classes of forcing notions. Even A(H(ω 2 ), Σ 2 , σ-centered ) is false if CH fails. Indeed, by adding ω 1 Cohen reals, a σ-centered forcing notion, one adds a Luzin set, that is, an uncountable set of reals that intersects every meager set in at most a countable set. Notice that saying that there exists a Luzin set is a Σ 2 statement in H(ω 2 ). But then we may iterate in length the continuum Amoeba-category, a σ-centered forcing notion, so that in the generic extension every set of size ω 1 is meager. Since any iteration of Amoeba-category with finite support is Knaster, the argument shows that A(H(ω 2 ), Σ 2 , Knaster) is false. Note that the argument also shows that A(H(ω 2 ), Σ ∼ 2 , σ-centered ) is false, since given any set of reals in H(ω 2 ) we can force with Amoeba-category to make it meager.
6.1. Φ = Σ 1 : Since A(H(ω 2 ), Σ 1 ) holds (see 3.2), the interesting case is with parameters.
Notice that A(H(ω 2 ), Σ ∼ 1 , P) implies the negation of CH, for any P that adds a real number.
For ccc posets, the axiom turns out to be equivalent to Martin's axiom for ω 1 , as given in the following result due independently to Stavi-Väänänen [37] , and [8]:
Theorem 6.1. The following are equivalent:
In fact, we have that for every ccc poset P,
Since, as it is well-known, Martin's axiom is consistent relative to ZFC, we have as a corollary of the Theorem above that so is the axiom
For some particular forcing notions we have nice characterizations of the corresponding axioms, for instance, from 6.1 and some basic results on the additivity of the ideals of null and meager sets of reals (see [7] ), we have the following: 
This is a consequence of the following result, which generalizes 6.1, together with the results of [18] on the consistency strength of BP F A and BSP F A. It shows that the bounded forcing axioms are, in fact, equivalent to axioms of generic absoluteness for H(ω 2 ), thus revealing them as natural axioms of set Theory.
Theorem 6.4. ([9])
(1) The following are equivalent:
Asperó-Welch [6] produced a model of BSPFA where BMM fails, assuming the consistency of a large-cardinal notion slightly weaker than an ω 1 -Erdös cardinal. This was later improved by Asperó [4] by constructing such a model from the optimal large cardinal assumption, namely, the existence of a Σ 2 -reflecting cardinal. Also, Schindler has shown, starting from cardinals κ < λ < µ < ν such that κ is remarkable, λ is Σ 2 -reflecting, µ is Woodin, and ν is measurable, that forcing with the Levy collapse of κ to ω 1 , and then forcing BPFA with a proper forcing in V λ , one obtains a model in which BSPFA fails.
A(H(ω 2 ), Σ ∼ 1 , P) is clearly inconsistent with ZFC for any P that collapses ω 1 . Further, the axiom A(H(ω 2 ), Σ ∼ 1 , ω 1 -pres) is also inconsistent with ZFC. For if S is a stationary and co-stationary subset of ω 1 , then, by Baumgartner-Harrington-Kleinberg [23] , we can add a club C ⊆ S while preserving ω 1 . But then the axiom would imply that such a club exists in the ground model, and so the complement of S is not stationary.
A Theorem 6.5.
[3] Let Γ be the class of all posets P such that for every set X of cardinality ℵ 1 of stationary subsets of ω 1 there is a condition p ∈ P such that p forces that S is stationary for every S ∈ X. The axiom
The axiom can be forced assuming the existence of a Σ 2 -reflecting cardinal which is the limit of strongly compact cardinals.
On the other hand, Woodin [43] provides a fine analysis of the axioms of the form A(H(ω 2 ), Σ ∼ 1 , Γ), assuming the axiom ( * ) (see [43] ), plus that every set X belongs to a model with a Woodin cardinal above X, an assumption which is, consistency-wise, weaker that the existence of a proper class of Woodin cardinals, hence consistency-wise much weaker than the large-cardinal assumption in Asperó's Theorem above. Woodin shows that for every A ∈ H(ω 2 ) and every Π 1 sentence, with A as a parameter, that holds in V , there is a ω 1 -sequence of stationary subsets of ω 1 such that any forcing notion that forces the negation of the sentence must destroy one of the stationary sets in the sequence. Thus, this yields a stronger form of Asperó's result, under a, consistency-wise, much weaker hypothesis. However, while Asperó's axiom can be forced assuming large cardinals, this is not known to be the case for Woodin's ( * ) axiom.
Numerous consequences, mostly combinatorial, of the axioms BPFA, BSPFA, and BMM are known (see [5] and [40] ).
Woodin [43] showed that if one assumes the existence of a measurable cardinal, or that the non-stationary ideal on ω 1 is precipitous, then BM M implies a combinatorial principle, called ψ AC , which in turn implies that there is a well-ordering of the reals in length ω 2 which is definable, with parameters, in H(ω 2 ), and hence c = ℵ 2 . Further, Asperó [1] showed that if BMM holds and for some x ∈ H(ω 2 ), x does not exist, then also c = ℵ 2 . Improving on Woodin's result, Asperó-Welch [6] showed that if there exists a ω 1 -Erdös cardinal, then BMM implies ψ AC . More consequences of BMM were obtained by Asperó [2] , for instance, he showed that BMM implies that the dominating number is ℵ 2 . Finally, in a truly remarkable result, Todorcevic [39] has recently shown that BMM implies that there is a wellordering of the reals in length ω 2 which is definable, with parameters, in H(ω 2 ), and hence c = ℵ 2 . For this reason alone BMM deserves a detailed study. Unfortunately, its consistency strength is not known, and, while it may even imply that every projective set is determined, it is not even known whether it implies that every projective set of reals numbers is Lebesgue measurable. A few months ago R. Schindler proved the following: Theorem 6.6 (R. Schindler). BMM implies that for every set X there is an inner model with a strong cardinal containing X.
Thus, in particular, BMM implies that for every set X, X exists. In his Ph. D. Thesis, G. Hjorth [22] proved that Martin's axiom plus the existence of the sharp of every real number imply that every Σ ∼ 
The arguments from the beginning of last section show that 
V P if P adds some real. So, the most we can hope for is A(L(R), Σ, Γ), i.e., without parameters, or, if we want parameters, we have to restrict them to ordinals and reals. So, whenever we write
that is the identity on the ordinals and, of course, on the reals. The following theorem of H. Woodin (see [43] ) shows that under large cardinals the theory of L(R), with real parameters, is generically absolute.
Theorem 8.1. If there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, then A(L(R),
Woodin and, independently, Steel, have shown that the consistency strength of A(L(R), Σ ω (R)) is roughly that of the existence of infinitelymany Woodin cardinals (see [38] ). They have also shown that, actually, A(L(R), Σ ω (R)) implies that the Axiom of Determinacy, AD, holds in L(R).
It follows from results of Shelah and Woodin that A(L(R), Σ ∼ 1 , Semi-proper ) is false, assuming the existence of large cardinals. For if, for instance, there is a supercompact cardinal, then Shelah has shown that one can force, by a semi-proper forcing notion that collapses the supercompact cardinal to ω 2 , the non-stationary ideal on ω 1 to be saturated (see [24] ) (a Woodin cardinal actually suffices for this (Shelah [36] )). Since, in addition, in this model every set has a sharp, it follows from results of Woodin [43] that L(R) computes correctly ω 2 . Let α = ω V 2 . Then the Σ 2 sentence with α as a parameter, which states that α is a cardinal greater or equal than ω 2 , is true in the L(R) of the ground model V , but false in the L(R) of the generic extension.
However, I. Neeman and J. Zapletal [31] For ccc forcing notions we have the following exact equiconsistency results. The first one follows from work of Kunen and Harrington-Shelah [20] (see [11] ). It is open whether a Σ ω -Mahlo cardinal is necessary for the consistency of A(L(R), Σ ∼ ω , Γ ∩ strongly-proper ). We finally look at the general projective ccc case: Let us recall from [10] that if κ is a cardinal and n ∈ ω, we say that κ is Σ n -weakly compact (Σ n -w.c., for short) iff κ is inaccessible and for every R ⊆ V κ which is definable by a Σ n formula (with parameters) over V κ and every Π 1 1 sentence Φ, if V κ , ∈, R |= Φ then there is α < κ such that
That is, κ reflects Π 1 1 sentences with Σ n predicates. Also, recall from [28] that a cardinal κ is Σ ω -weakly compact (Σ ω -w.c., for short), iff κ is Σ n -w.c. for every n ∈ ω. 
